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Michael S. Greve*
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I. PARALLEL PREEMPTION WORLDS
Erwin Chemerinsky has highlighted the crucial problem and, as it turns
out, the central point of our disagreement with respect to preemption and its
federalism dimension. Federalism, Chemerinsky says, is (or ought to be)
about empowering government at all levels.' This perspective implies
preemption doctrines that ensure, so far as possible, that the strictest
regulator-whether that is the federal government or a single state-shall
dominate the entire universe of transactions. In other words, more
regulation is ipsofacto better regulation. Chemerinsky is not alone in taking
this view. Of late, a growing band of scholars, advocates, and Supreme
Court Justices have embraced similar "empowerment" theories of
John G. Serale Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; PhD (Cornell 1985).
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 69, 70 (2005) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption]; see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When it Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328-29 (2004) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, A Different Approach] (stating
that rather than looking at federalism "primarily in terms of limiting federal power so as to protect
state sovereignty," we can view federalism as "empowering government.").
federalism. 2  But those theories are antithetical to the constitutional logic
and architecture.
A constitution, or at any rate the Constitution we have, is not about
empowering but about disciplining government, and federalism is a large
part of that enterprise. As James Madison famously wrote, "you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself."3  For the purpose of controlling the governed, one
central empowered sovereign is quite enough and (as the examples of France
and of most authoritarian regimes teach) probably more efficient than a more
decentralized and fragmented arrangement.4  The point of endowing
subordinate (state) sovereigns with authority over the same citizens and
territory-while limiting the central authority's sphere of authority-is to
create rival centers of power, to make "[a]mbition ... counteract ambition,"5
and in that fashion to make government control and discipline itself.6 The
constitutional structure-not, as Chemerinsky would have it, the Bill of
Rights exclusively 7 -is supposed to do the work here.
From this constitutional vantage, the preemption landscape will look
very different from Chemerinsky's universe. His empowerment federalism
produces an exceedingly robust presumption against preemption.8 The
constitutional perspective, in contrast, suggests that a judicial presumption
for or against preemption should depend on the congruence of federal
regulation with the core purposes of enumerated federal powers-foremost,
the protection of interstate commerce. 9 For reasons suggested below,'° I am
somewhat skeptical about the extent to which constitutional presumptions
can yield a coherent "preemption jurisprudence." But to the extent that we
can approximate that objective, we can do a whole lot better than
2. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1369-
73 (2001) (discussing the "ideal theory of federalism" and evaluating the current federalism
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court); REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE STATES IN
SHAPING "OUR FEDERALISM" passim (Douglas T. Kendall ed., 2004); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 56-65 (2005).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 269 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
4. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation,
Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341 (2004)
(describing the development of French and German constitutional law in the wake of, among other
factors, the authoritarian regimes of Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany).
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 268.
6. Id. Madison noted that by dividing the powers "between two distinct governments" America
created a "double security" as "to the rights of the people." Id. at 270. This design would cause
"[tihe different governments [to] control each other; at the same time that each [would] be controled
[sic] by itself." Id.
7. Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, supra note 1, at 74-75.
8. See also Chemerinsky, A Different Approach, supra note 1, at 1317-18. Chemerinsky notes
that if states are viewed as independent sovereigns in the federal system, which they should be under
the empowerment theory of federalism, then "there is a presumption against finding preemption."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 107 (2002) [hereinafter
Greve, Federalism 's Frontier].
10. See discussion infra Part V.
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Chemerinskian empowerment federalism-and probably, somewhat better
than the Rehnquist Court.
II. OPPORTUNISM, EVERYWHERE You LOOK
The principal obstacle to a coherent preemption doctrine, Chemerinsky
argues, is the political opportunism of the Rehnquist Court, meaning its
conservative majority." Echoing other scholars,' 2 Chemerinsky observes a
sharp discontinuity between federalism cases and preemption cases.' 3 A
bloc of five conservative Justices holds together (more precisely, held
together) very well in federalism cases, where a pro-federalism, pro-state
stance generally translates into a substantively conservative policy position,
such as a narrower scope for federal civil rights laws. 14 On account of that
congruence, the conservatives consistently vote for state empowerment and
against the federal government. But their pro-state sentiment, the theory
continues, goes by the boards in preemption cases, where a pro-state stance
typically translates into a liberal, pro-regulatory position that would allow a
broader range of action for state legislators, trial lawyers, and attorneys
general. In that context, the conservative bloc is said to set federalism aside
and to vote against the states.15 None of this is tenable, however. Putting
aside that the once-stable federalism bloc has collapsed, 16 the "conservative
flip-flop" account is empirically baseless, politically tendentious, and
theoretically flawed.
11. Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, supra note 1, at 70.
12. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462-63 (2002); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism
Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 753-54 (2000); Brady Baybeck & William Lowry,
Federalism Outcomes and Ideological Preferences: The U.S. Supreme Court and Preemption Cases,
PUBLIUS, Summer 2000, at 73, 82-91.
13. Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, supra note 1, at 70-74.
14. Id. at 70-71.
15. Id. at 72-74.
16. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act was a valid exercise of congressional authority); Nevada Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003) (holding that state employees could recover money
damages when the state failed to act in accordance with the family-care provision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633, 637-38 (1999)
(holding that recipients of federal funding could be liable for damages in an action based on
"student-on-student harassment."). Supreme Court decisions postdating this conference confirm the
disintegration of the federalism bloc. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (holding
that the Controlled Substances Act was a valid exercise of congressional power and that Congress
had the power to control "portions of [interstate] markets that [were] supplied with drugs produced
and consumed locally."); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2005)
(holding that Title IX's private right of action included claims for retaliation "where the funding
recipient retaliate[d] against an individual because he... complained about sex discrimination.").
Jonathan Klick and I have undertaken an empirical study of the
Rehnquist Court's preemption decisions.' 7 There are 105 such decisions
between the 1987-1988 and the 2003-2004 terms inclusive. 8  Upon
inspection, the cases distribute themselves in ways that differ substantially
from common perceptions of the jurisprudence and of judicial voting
behavior in this area. The most striking difference between perception and
reality is the widespread impression of a conservative flip-flop. The
conservative Justices do tend to vote together in preemption cases, but they
do so regardless of whether the outcome is for or against preemption. They
vote together because all Justices tend to vote together in preemption cases.
More than half of the Rehnquist Court's preemption cases have been decided
unanimously, or nearly so.' 9 Conservative Justices may be more likely to
vote for preemption than are liberal Justices, but they do not necessarily do
so consistently.20
Only two cases fit the picture of a wholesale "inversion," such that the
five so-called conservative Justices vote for preemption and the liberal
Justices, "for the states" (as in, against preemption). Chemerinsky manages
to unearth one of those cases, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly2 ' (and even
here, the picture is arguably complicated by the dormant Commerce Clause
issues presented and decided in the case).22 Ignoring the only other such
case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 3 Chemerinsky moves on to Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. 24 That case-his bete noire-comes close, but
it's no cigar: the pro-preemption majority opinion was written by Justice
Breyer, and the conservative Justice Thomas was among the dissenters.25
Chemerinsky's third example is American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,
2 6
where Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia joined Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Stevens in dissenting from the majority's pro-preemption ruling.27 If that is
an example of "the conservative Rehnquist Court" in action, I give up.
Perhaps, one could still argue that the conservative Justices' anti-
regulatory policy preferences too often override their ostensible federalism
commitments. But if so, one ought to be prepared to entertain the
17. See Michael Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=634263.
18. Id. at 6 and app. A.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Seeid. at51.
21. Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, supra note 1, at 72-73 (citing Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
22. The determination of separate (and dispositive) legal issues in a single case raises a distinct
possibility of strategic judicial voting. In other words, one cannot simply assume that the
preemption votes in Lorillard are independent observations.
23. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
24. Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, supra note 1, at 72 (citing Geier v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
25. Geier, 529 U.S. at 864, 886.
26. Chemerinsky, The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, supra note 1, at 73 (citing Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)).
27. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430.
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hypothesis that the same opportunism might be at work on the liberal side.
How is it that Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, the most implacable
opponents of the Rehnquist Court's federalism, suddenly discover their
federalist credentials and affections in preemption cases?28 What principle,
other than a premise of "the strictest regulator always wins," might explain
that discontinuity? Among the scholars who take the conservative Justices
to task for inconsistency and "hypocrisy" at the federalism front, none (so
far as I can see) have asked, let alone answered, that question - including
Chemerinsky.2 9 The selective deployment of the "flip-flop" theory, coupled
with its lack of a sound empirical foundation, suggests that its principal
point is not to explain but to polemicize: let's hoist the conservatives by
their federalism petard and mobilize their "states' rights" sympathies for
pro-regulatory purposes.
That strategy requires an identification of a pro-state position in
preemption cases with "federalism." In other words, one has to argue that
anything the states wish to do is ipso facto federalism. That view has found
some takers,30 but it is transparently absurd. States often seek to finance
their operations by taxing citizens, firms, and transactions in other states.
The satisfaction of domestic political demands by means of external wealth
transfers (such as extraterritorial taxation or export cartels of the Parker v.
Brown variety), 31 raising rivals' costs, and throwing up protectionist barriers
is an efficient strategy from the states' vantage, though obviously not from a
global wealth perspective. To argue that federalism demands a "pro-state"
position in preemption cases over federal statutes that aim to protect
interstate commerce (and the states themselves) against such stratagems is to
argue that federalism must let the states go their exploitative ways.
One could, I suppose, have a "states' rights" theory of that description-
just as one can have an "individual rights" theory that would justify my fist
in your face. But a more consistent, attractive, and constitutional position is
to insist that states' rights cannot possibly encompass rights to aggression
(and to the Framers' minds, state exploitation of non-citizens did constitute
an "act of aggression").3 2 On that view, a rock-ribbed federalist who votes
"for the states" in federalism cases may well vote "against the states" in
28. The liberal Justices vote more consistently against preemption than the conservative Justices
vote for it. See Greve & Klick, supra note 17, manuscript at 57.
29. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign
Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1283, 1286 (calling the decision by a
conservative majority in Alden and several subsequent federalism cases "the height of judicial
hypocrisy"); William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1217, 1245 (2002) (accusing conservative Justices of "engaging in unbridled
hypocrisy.").
30. See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 2, at 61-63, 137-38.
31. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 31.
preemption cases, to the extent that federal statutes preempt the states from
acting on their opportunistic, exploitative preferences.
The operative word, alas, is "may." It is not at all clear that the Justices'
preemption analysis has been informed by constitutional considerations that
merit that honorific.
III. INCOHERENCE (?)
As noted, over half of the Supreme Court's preemption decisions are
unanimous (or nearly so). 33 That remarkable figure, which far exceeds the
degree of unanimity in the general run of Supreme Court decisions,3 4 may
seem to suggest that on the whole, the rules of the preemption game are
tolerably clear. Nonetheless, scholars are virtually unanimous in lamenting
the lack of predictability and doctrinal coherence in the Supreme Court's
preemption decisions. By and large, those misgivings strike me as justified.
Three observations illustrate the point.
First, several close and important preemption cases contain rousing
invocations of "federalism"-met by other Justices' studied indifference to
federalism concerns or by perplexed statements to the effect that the case at
bar has nothing to do with federalism (and how could anyone think
otherwise?). One does not consistently find individual Justices on one or the
other side of that divide. In his dissent in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities
Board,a5 Justice Breyer appealed to federalism concerns, which Justice
Scalia's majority opinion dismissed with an air of consternation.36 In Geier,
it was Justice Breyer's turn to simply ignore the dissenters' federalism
protestations. 37 The point here is not to accuse, let alone convict, Justice
Breyer or any other Justice of inconsistency. Good and sufficient legal
reasons may prompt Justices to raise federalism concerns in some
preemption cases but not others. The point is simply this: even at the basic
level of deciding whether preemption cases are merely exercises in statutory
construction or rather (or also) present federalism questions, there appears to
be little judicial agreement.
Second, and (as noted) quite at odds with the common picture of
ideological voting behavior, preemption cases are increasingly decided by
unlikely coalitions. In important cases (such as Garamendi), one now finds
members of what one might call the Chemerinsky bloc-Justices Souter,
33. Greve & Klick, supra note 17, manuscript at 17.
34. Over half (54 of 105) of the Rehnquist Court's preemption decisions were unanimous,
significantly higher than the general degree of unanimity for the court, which is 40.3% for all cases.
Id. To compare this with a recent general statistical summary of general unanimity, see The
Supreme Court, 2003 Term: The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 502 (2004) (an example of the
Harvard Law Review's annual statistical summary of the Court's decisions for each Term-Table I
(C) in the 1986-2003 publications contains the Court's unanimity statistics).
35. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
36. Id. at 412 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 378 n.6.
37. See generally Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). Justice Breyer's opinion
for the Court does not discuss or even mention the dissenters' federalism arguments. Id.
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Stevens, and Ginsburg-in a voting coalition with the Court's most
conservative members.38
A third indication of the lack of coherence emerges from the statistical
pattern of preemption cases. 9 Trying to explain that pattern, one finds that
certain "signals" or "cues" explain quite a bit of the variance. For example,
it matters a whole lot with respect to the outcomes what the Solicitor
General has to say.40 It also matters whether a state is a party to the case:
Pro-preemption outcomes are far more likely in cases among private parties
than in cases to which a state is a party. 4 A heavy reliance on signals
suggests that the Court has no other reliable way of ordering the universe of
cases. To that extent, the near-universal laments about the lack of coherence
and doctrinal clarity in preemption law have an empirical basis.
With characteristic good cheer, Dean Starr has assured us that by the
end of the day, we shall have engineered a coherent preemption regime.42 I
share his aspiration, and I shall try to contribute what little I can to this lofty
objective-though not without conceding the real limits to the enterprise.
Preemption cases are statutory interpretation cases, which raises the question
of whether preemption law can be any more coherent than the underlying
statutes. Those statutes will always be ambiguous (at least in the cases that
become the stuff of litigation), so one has to approach statutory
interpretation with some set of presumptions. The presumptions, not the
statutes, are supposed to yield coherence. What then should they be?
That substantive inquiry does not settle the independent question of how
aggressively or intensively we should deploy those presumptions. Even
under the most robust set of presumptions, the differences in the underlying
statutes will and should matter a great deal. In other words, there is a real
limit to the extent to which one can squeeze a coherent "preemption law" out
of the presumption lemon. But we should insist on presumptions that cohere
internally, with the constitutional framework, and over the general run of
cases. It is on those margins that we should and probably can do better.
38. Michael S. Greve, The Term the Constitution Died, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 232-34
(2004). Here again, one ought to be careful before jumping to behavioralist inferences. Preemption
cases tend to be arcane and, moreover, involve a wide range of competing considerations, from
statutory construction to the role of constitutional (federalism) canons to the weight of pragmatic,
economic considerations. The Justices may follow legal considerations that give way to more
overtly political preferences in big, one-dimensional constitutional cases that play out on Broadway.
Perhaps advocates in preemption cases-unlike lawyers who argue, say, affirmative action or
abortion cases---can reasonably assume, or at least hope, that legal arguments might actually matter.
Their trouble on this theory is that they cannot predict what legal arguments might matter to whom
in what case. Preemption lawyers on all sides must build judicial coalitions in the sand. Id.
39. See generally Greve & Klick, supra note 17.
40. See id. at 39-43.
41. Seeid. at 30-34.
42. Kenneth W. Star, Dean, Pepperdine University School of Law, Welcome Address at the
Pepperdine Law Review Symposium: Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of
Medical Drugs and Devices (April 9, 2005).
IV. "TRADITION" AND "CLEAR STATEMENTS"
The key presumption in preemption law is a presumption against
preemption in areas of traditional state authority, unless Congress clearly
indicates an intent to preempt.43 That presumption appeals to many liberals
(including Chemerinsky) because it favors pro-regulatory constituencies-
legislators as well as state attorneys general, state courts, and plaintiffs'
lawyers-in close cases. It appeals to many conservatives because it sounds
protective of the states and seems to capture a part of the original,
constitutional idea of enumerated powers. 4 It appeals to scholars with no
overt ideological agenda because it promises to give states something
important to do in an era of a constitutionally unlimited government-in
other words, to salvage a piece of federalism after the constitutional
revolution of the New Deal. 45 Even with the best of intentions, however, it
is notoriously difficult to mimic, replicate, or even approximate first-order
principles with second-best rules. So here: important features of the
enumerated powers logic get lost in translation into a "presumption against
preemption" in areas of traditional state authority.
First, the category of "traditional state powers" is arbitrary. In
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,4 6 Justice Stevens first identified health and safety
regulation as a "traditional" state task;47 then acknowledged that federal
intervention in the field of drugs and medical devices dates back to 1906;48
and finally nonetheless invoked the presumption against federal preemption
of "traditional" state functions in support of an anti-preemption ruling.49
With equal justice, one could argue that drugs and medical devices have
"traditionally" been of such overriding federal concern as to prompt an early
and, at the time, quite unusual federal intervention as soon as those products
showed up in interstate commerce.
Even if "traditional state powers" were a more reliable category, it
would not tell us much about the crucial question of which powers fall under
that category. A century ago, the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether Congress could regulate liability questions over employer-employee
relations in the railroad industry. 50 Back then, the corporate employers'
opposition to the federal intervention rested on the slogan that has now
become the trial bar's mantra: tort law is an area of "traditional state
authority." (The more things change, the more they stay the same.) The
43. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
44. KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION 5-14, 40-56 (1991).
45. See, e.g., Young, supra note 2, at 1369.
46. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). Medtronic is discussed at length by several contributors to this volume.
See Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2005); David
C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (2005).
47. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 485.
50. See Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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Supreme Court responded, correctly to my mind, that every authority will be
exercised at some point for the first time.5" At most, "tradition" can offer
interpretive help. It cannot be a substitute for a substantive, textually
grounded analysis.
Second, and more important, the presumption against preemption saves
only half of the enumerated powers logic. That logic "empowers" state
governments principally by disabling the national government from acting in
some sphere. Within that sphere, the federal government cannot impose a
ceiling on what states may do.52 In that sense, the states are empowered -
and good for them. The flip side is that the federal government cannot set a
floor under the states either.53 The encumbrance on the free exercise of the
states' powers is not federal preemption but the threat that the losers of
redistributive policies may "vote with their feet." In short, under the
enumerated powers arrangement, state power and the discipline of interstate
competition come in a single package.
The "presumption against preemption" captures only the first half:
Congress should not easily be able to set a ceiling. It fails to capture the
second part, which is that Congress has no power to set a floor. A
congressional "floor," after all, leaves states free to regulate more
stringently. So, it is not a true preemption, and therefore cannot be subject
to a presumption against preemption. The presumption, it transpires, does
not mimic the original rules at all. Rather, it substitutes for genuine state
competition a freakish arrangement that subjects private actors to
overlapping regulatory regimes without exits or stopping points.5 4  It is
manifestly calculated not to approximate, but rather to invert the first-order
rules.
Consistent with their embrace of the "presumption against preemption,"
anti-preemption scholars often argue that the "clear statement" rule that
governs statutory federalism cases should be extended to preemption
cases.55 In statutory federalism cases, their argument runs, the Supreme
Court generally applies a "clear statement" rule, which holds that Congress
will not be presumed to have exposed state or local governments to private
suits unless Congress has clearly expressed its intent to that effect. 56 But
why
51. Id. at 521-22.
52. See Greve, Federalism's Frontier, supra note 9, at 107.
53. See id.
54. See generally id. at 107-08.
55. See STARR ET AL., supra note 44, at 40-56; Young, supra note 2, at 1386-88.
56. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
should that presumption not apply in preemption cases, which pose very
similar federalism risks?
The answer is that the federalism risks are not comparable. There is a
real and constitutionally meaningful difference between an affirmative
command to a state authority-whether through direct "commandeering" or
by exposing state authorities to private suits-and a mere limitation upon the
exercise of that authority. While I am inclined to think that the distinction
between a positive order and a "negative," preemptive restriction is
persuasive even at a purely conceptual level, it also rests on firm
constitutional ground. A crucial difference between the Articles of
Confederation and the U.S. Constitution is the federal government's
authority to enforce its own laws directly, without the assistance or
intermediation of the states. 57 This central element of the federal order in
turn implies that federal attempts to dragoon state governments into service
are inherently suspect. The constitutional architecture reflects this principle
and baseline expectation. The federal authority to restrain the states under
the Supremacy Clause sweeps across the entire field in which the federal
government is competent to act. In contrast, instances where the federal
government may commandeer the states' performance are carefully
circumscribed and limited in number, and most of those clauses (for
example, the Fugitive Slave Clause)58 have not been notable success stories.
In short, the constitutional structure itself implies a distinction between
restraining the states and bossing them around.
The distinction between affirmative command and mere limitation is
basic to federalism cases. For example, it distinguishes Printz v. United
States,5 9 a true commandeering case, from Reno v. Condon,60 a mere
"limitations" case. In "clear statement" cases, one cannot explain the
rationale for the rule and its range without the distinction between
affirmative command and mere limits. On the flipside, this means that the
clear statement rule should not apply in preemption cases.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS
So what is the right rule or presumption for preemption cases? To my
mind, one has to tie preemption presumptions to the original constitutional
logic-that is, the logic of enumerated powers. I will confine myself to
suggesting the general direction of such an approach.
Left to their own devices, states would do very bad things to one
another, to the national government, and to each other's citizens. Factions
and interest groups, operating at the state level, would persistently seek to
tax and exploit other states and their citizens. States would enact debtor
57. See PETER HAY & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-12
(1982) (comparing the central government's role under the Articles and the Constitution).
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
59. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
60. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
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relief laws, coin paper money, form compacts and alliances to the detriment
of other states, and engage in various other nefarious schemes.
The Constitution supplies means to counteract those risks. With respect
to state activities that particularly alarmed the Framers-paper money,
impairments of the obligation of contracts, and so forth-Article 1, Section
10 provides for either a complete prohibition or for a requirement of
congressional consent. 6 1  Beyond that, the Supremacy Clause,62 in
63conjunction with the federal government's enumerated powers, affords a
ready means of redress for sectarian state schemes.
Under this general framework, should any judicial presumption attach to
the exercise of federal (preemptive) legislation? The answer depends on
what it takes to render the constitutional provisions adequate to their
intended purpose.
At least one of the Framers-James Madison, as it happens--doubted
that enterprise altogether: he left the Constitutional Convention in despair
because he thought the proposed Constitution failed to afford sufficient
means to keep state-based factions under control. 64 At the Convention,
Madison had pushed hard but unsuccessfully for a national "negative"-that
is to say, a constitutional proviso that no state law may take effect without
the affirmative assent of the United States Congress.65 Madison remained
committed to that idea as late as October 24, 1787 after the close of the
Convention.66 In a famous letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison wrote:
The restraints agst. [sic] paper [admissions], and violations of
contracts are not sufficient. Supposing them to be effectual as far as
they go, they are short of the mark. Injustice may be effected by
such an infinitude of legislative expedients, that where the
disposition exists it can only be [controlled] by some provision
which reaches all cases whatsoever. The partial provision made [in
the Constitution], supposes the disposition which will evade it. 67
Repeat after Madison: "The partial provision made, supposes the
disposition [on the part of the states] which will evade it."' 68 More clearly
than his contemporaries (with the possible exception of Hamilton) and far
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
64. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARv. L. REv. 611, 670-71 (1999)
(undertaking a splendid discussion of Madison's proposal and its fate at the Constitutional
Convention).
65. Id.
66. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 146 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
67. Id.
68. Id.
more clearly than the great majority of contemporary experts on preemption
and federalism law, Madison understood that the federal government does
not act on states, period. It acts and operates on states that have every
incentive, every reason, and countless means to evade federal strictures.
While that may seem an unduly pessimistic view of the matter,
American constitutional history provides ample reason to believe that it is
right. In particular, the dormant or "negative" Commerce Clause, which
bars certain forms of state legislation even in the absence of any
congressional intervention, points in that direction. That so-called "clause,"
of course, does not appear in the Constitution, and there are good reasons to
describe it as a wholesale judicial invention.69 If the dormant Commerce
Clause has nonetheless withstood the test of time, that is probably because
one cannot make the federal system work without it. The affirmative
exercise of federal supremacy is too uncertain and too fraught with
institutional impediments to serve as a safeguard against the states'
"disposition to evade it."7 °
The logical extension of that basic insight, it seems to me, is to afford
federal statutes broad preemptive force where such statutes are demonstrably
targeted to curtail the federalism risks that alarmed the Framers - in
particular, the risk of interstate exploitation and interferences with interstate
commerce. 71 With respect to federal laws that regulate network industries,
interstate spillovers (such as pollution),72 or cost shifting (such as products
liability and class actions), 73 one ought to start with the Madisonian intuition
and read federal preemptive statutes for all they are worth That implies,
among other things, an expansive implied preemption doctrine. Conversely,
where Congress purports to regulate economic activities and preempts state
legislation that has no adverse effects on interstate commerce, a more
restrictive interpretation seems warranted. Statutes regulating workplace
conditions or localized environmental events fit this description.74 The
regulating states will at all events have to live with the costs as well as the
benefits of their laws, and state competition acts as a potent disciplining
mechanism. Nothing in federalism's constitutional architecture warrants a
judicial presumption in favor of the federal government. In fact, in these
69. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[Tlhe 'negative Commerce Clause' ... is 'negative' not only because it negates state
regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution."); Tyler Pipe Indus.
v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
dormant Commerce Clause as "a sort of intellectual adverse possession.").
70. For a slightly more elaborate explication of this point, see Michael S. Greve, Compacts,
Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. REV. 285, 315-19 (2003); see also Robert R.
Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating the Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L.
REv. 25 (2005).
71. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REV. 93, 163 (2004).
72. See 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000), superseded by Pub. L. 92-500, § 2, 88 Stat. 816.
73. See 8 U.S.C. §1101 (2000), repealed by Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2003)
(repealing the current version of the statute and recognizing a prior version based on implied
preemption); see also Memorandum on Deterring Illegal Immigration, 60 Fed. Reg. 7885 (Feb. 7,
1995) (interpreting § 1101 's cost-shifting implications).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 670 (2000).
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sorts of contexts, a "presumption against preemption" and a "clear statement
rule" look like sensible ways of approximating the logic of the
constitutional, enumerated powers architecture.
In some quarters, a set of preemption presumptions that deliberately
mimics the constitutional logic will be suspect as an attempt to resurrect, in
the guise of an underhanded judicial canon, a discredited "Constitution in
Exile." That charge might have merit if the presumptions were deployed
very aggressively, as a judicial means of constructing statutes that Congress
never enacted. I am inclined to think, however, that the structure of most
federal preemption statutes actually tracks the constitutional intuitions
reasonably well. To that extent, the presumptions just sketched would aid in
the faithful judicial interpretation of congressional purposes and their
application to state laws that Congress, in the nature of things, could not
have foreseen. But I must leave that large subject for another day.
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